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I Introduction
The rapid and large-scale growth of micro-finance
institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh would suggest
that they have emerged as a credible alternative to
the informal sector, and that MFI-members have
reduced their dependence on the usurious money-
lender.2 Is this observation consistent with the
empirical evidence? The present research examines
whether households' increased access to MFI credit
has substituted for higher-cost informal credit
sources.
It is traditionally argued3 that providing targeted
production credit to the rural poor through micro-
credit schemes is likely to initiate a 'virtuous cycle'
of increased household income through increased
saving and investment. However, it is unlikely that
MFI credit alone will kick-start the 'virtuous cycle'
of perpetual growth across all households.
Successful operation of this cycle depends upon
the household's human and physical capital
resource (such as the size and age structure of the
household, its wealth, and the market imperfec-
tions it faces), the MFI lending technology, eco-
nomic opportunities within and around the village,
and the macro-economic and policy environment.
Each factor, alone or in combination, affects a
household's allocation of credit to specific uses.
For resource-endowed households, increased
credit access may have a positive effect on their
risk-bearing capacity, enhance fresh investments
and encourage the adoption of new, more risky
An earlier version of this article was presented as a
paper at the PRUS Workshop on 'Recent Research on
Micro-finance: Implications for Policy' in February 1998,
and at seminars at the World Bank, USAID and
University of East Angus. Useful comments from
Monique Cohen, Michael Lipton, Richard Rosenberg,
Manohar Sharma and Jacob Yaron, and seminar
participants are gratefully acknowledged. The usual
disclaimers apply
2 However, the old consensus in the analytical literature
on rural credit, of the conservative peasanUwicked
moneylender variety, has now been replaced with a
perception that interest rates are much less extortionate,
and moneylenders, rather than being wicked and
exploitative, provide important and difficult services of
consumption smoothing, human-capital formation, off-
farm income generation and insurance.
Most commonly in Grameen Bank documents which
set out the raison d'eire for micro-credit.
technologies to expand their enterprises. It may also
alter the structure of their assets and liabilities and
decrease the level of credit obtained at high cost
from informal sources. On the other hand, poorer
households may often face consumption crises for
food and other basic non-food items, leading to
steep demands for credit to increase current cori-
sumption at the expense of future consumption
(Zeller et al. 1997).
MFI lending technology is insensitive to variations
in household conditions. Most MFIs put all house-
holds on a treadmill of continuously increasing loan
size4 and insist on a fixed repayment schedule.
While an easily accessible loan may seem attractive
to a cash-starved poor household, its resource pro-
file and the wider economic and policy environ-
ment may impose limits on the marginal return to
capital. Credit escalation under these circumstances
increases the likelihood of cross-financing to sustain
the MFI's line of credit.5 Some degree of cross-
financing is inevitable because of seasonal fluctua-
tions in income and when coping with shocks.
Often informal loans finance MFI loans. But cross-
financing can have a deleterious effect on the
household economy in the long-run if households
continuously manage loan repayment without hav-
ing the ability to repay
Through a detailed study of informal credit transac-
tions in a village in northern Bangladesh, the
research empirically establishes that, in spite of
increased outreach, MFI credit has been unable to
substitute for the informal sector. Informal lenders
are preferred for their local and timely access,
speedy disbursement and flexible repayment. MFI-
member households borrow as much from informal
sources as non-members of comparable groups.
Target-group households, in particular, resort to
extensive cross-financing of their loans: they use 89
per cent of informal loans and more than 78 per
cent of MFI loans for current consumption and
debt-servicing.6 The non-target group households,
on the other hand, use 60 per cent of informal loans
and 61 per cent of MFI loans for these two purposes.
Wiig (1997) refers to this process as capital deepening
which arises when additional credit is made available to
current borrowers from existing institutions.
Hossain (1984) and Osmani (1989) had anticipated
the limits to the rate of return of capital, and therefore
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The main messages emerging from the research are
that MFIs should eschew simplistic assumptions
that increasing loan size ensures increased benefit
across all household categories, or that households
must be deriving some benefit if loan repayment
rates are high. It is suggested that MEl lending tech-
nology be redesigned to be sensitive to household
initial conditions. For instance, elements of formal
sector lending should be incorporated for borrow-
ers with large credit needs, greater risk-bearing
capacity, an ability to provide collateral, and the
skills to invest in productive enterprises. For them
(i) the group contract and the joint liability system
can be dispensed with, (ii) different repayment
schedules devised, and (iii) loan applications
screened after detailed project appraisals. On the
other hand, MFIs should mimic the informal sector
when lending to poorer households by accounting
for seasonality and providing repayment flexibility
and a ceiling on the total loan size per household.
Only then can MFIs seriously compete with the
informal lenders.
2 Structure
The rest of the article is divided into 4 sections.
Section 3 describes briefly the village under study
Section 4 contains a detailed discussion on credit
transactions in the study village to provide a basis
for the analysis, in section 5, of informal credit bor-
rowings of MFI-member households. Section 6
summarises the main conclusions and provides
suggestions for improved policy design.
3 Study Village
Biprabari village in Madhupur Thana, in northern
Bangladesh, was purposively selected for the study
to build upon earlier rounds of field work con-
ducted since 1995 by one author in Biprabari and
three adjoining villages in Madhupur. Biprabari is
located on the north side of the busy Mymensingh
Madhupur Road near Kakraid bazaar. According
to our census (1997), the village has 92 households
of expansion of self-employment, through credit
escalation.
Households with less than 0.5 acre of landownersh p
constitute the target group households. Not all,
however, are MET members.
and 406 individuals. There are no non-Muslim
households.
Agriculture and wage labour are the main economic
activities. The latter consists of farm labour in the
village as well as non-farm labour mainly in the
nearby town of Madhupur.7 Only 21 per cent of
household heads are self-employed in carpentry,
petty shopkeeping, fuelwood selling, fishing, and
moneylending, and 8 per cent have salaried
employment outside the village as teachers, truck
drivers or shop assistants.
Agriculture is organised around the aman (har-
vested in NovemberDecember) and boro (har-
vested in MarchApril) cropping seasons. Paddy is
the main food crop sown widely in both seasons.
The average landholding per household is 73 deci-
mals. The landholding pattern is considerably
skewed as the top 25 per cent households own 83
per cent of total land in the village. Nearly one-third
of all households do not own any land but the Gini
coefficient is 0.375, implying that most landowning
households own relatively small pieces of land. The
average annual per capita income (1997) is Tk.
7,805.
The average household size is 4.4. Most households
are nuclear units consisting of the household head
(almost always the man), his wife and their chil-
dren. Occasionally, the married son and his family
or a widowed mother may live with the household
head. A common practice is for sons and brothers
to separate after marriage and set up their own
house within the same bañ. A bañ is a cluster of
houses where people of the same kinship group
live. Households within a bañ form a mutual insur-
ance network par excellence. Households are also
members of a samaj which is a wider network to
regulate social order through its leader and the
community court (or shaalish).9
Non-farm activities include rickshaw pulling and work
on brick kiins.
Decimal is a common unit of land measurement in the
area, 100 decimals = 1 acre.
For Hindus this usually corresponds to their caste
group. Muslims, who come from a certain area, recognise
a common leader or a common mosque (White 1992).
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A striking feature of the rural economy is the sea-
sonal (and uncertain) nature of the farmers'
cashflow. The seasons exert a strong influence on
the demand for credit because there is a consider-
able time lag between when expenditures are
incurred on farm inputs, such as fertilisers, and
when the crop is harvested and sold. This is
reflected in market transactions: not only farm
inputs but also food, clothing and sometimes even
health services are purchased on credit to be paid
off at harvest. Seasonal demands have an important
bearing on the farmer credit needs in the area.
4 Micro-Credit Transactions in
Biprabari
Madhupur has a very strong presence of member-
based MFIs providing credit. The schemes are tar-
geted at the functionally landless rural poor, issue
mostly small uncollateralised one-year term loans to
individuals belonging to jointly liable peer groups,
and use on-site loan disbursement and weekly col-
lection methods by forming village organisations.
Members are also required to save and deposit a
certain percentage of the loan amount, which is an
important source of revolving fund for the lender
and an emergency fund for the borrowers.b0
Beside Grameen Bank, other well-known MFIs like
ASA, BRAC, Buro-Tangail, Caritas, Proshika and
SDS service the area." Not all MFIs provide credit;
we have considered only those MFIs which do.
Further, of the 54 households that are members, 5
households have not taken credit from the MFI; so
only 49 member households are considered for
analysis.
Sixty-four individuals from 49 households are MFI
members. More than half are Grameen Bank mem-
bers (Table 1). On average, a GB member has been
a member for more than 10 years. Other MFIs are
recent entrants as their average membership period
ranges from 1-4 years. All MFIs except SDS have a
°All MFIs have a savings component but differ in terms
of members' access to savings.
"All except Grameen Bank are NGOs. Contrary to
popular view, GB is is not an NGO. It started as a pilot
project of the Bangladesh Bank and was converted into
a bank under a special charter in 1983.
land-based targeting criterion where the target
group is defined as households owning not more
than 50 decimals of land.'2 In practice, there is con-
siderable mis-targeting. Forty per cent of MFI mem-
ber households lie outside the target group. This is
also reflected in the high coefficients of variation of
land distribution of members.
Data on the extent of borrowings of MFI member
households is provided in Table 2. MFls have dis-
bursed a total sum of Tk. 455,980 GB loan dis-
bursement comprises more than 75 per cent of this
amount (to 50 per cent of the total members). GB
members have a large portfolio of loans which
include general, seasonal, housing, tubewell and
group fund loans. On average, there are 2.3 loans
per GB member. This suggests a capital deepening'4
process by which current borrowers receive addi-
tional credit (Wiig 1997). All except housing loans
are of one-year maturity Housing loans can be
repaid over 8-10 years with a weekly instalment of
1k. 20-80. Thirteen GB members have taken hous-
ing loans of an average size of Tk. 17,538. General
and seasonal loans are the most common.
The average outstanding MFI loan size per house-
hold is about Tk. 9,300. This figure is biased
upwards because of the large volume of credit dis-
bursed by Grameen Bank.'5 About 80 per cent of
MFI-member households borrow from one source.
But 60 per cent of those that borrow from more
than one source are GB members. The weekly
instalment size of a GB-member household is 1k.
293 per week. Thus, GB loans increase the house-
hold average loan size and consequently its debt
burden.
Almost all (87 per cent) households borrow from
informal sources. Consumption smoothing and
loan repayment are the main reasons for informal
borrowing across all household categories. At the
same time, more than 60 per cent of MFI loans are
"This is a household-based entry point targeting
criterion.
"This issue has been discussed in some detail in Matin
(l997b) and Zaman (1996).
' Here capital deepening is based on proxies like
membership length and on-time repayment of previous
loans. lt does not necessarily have a relationship with
capital building, which would arise if the successive
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also used for these two purposes. What is the inter-
relationship between the informal and MFI-credit
markets? Are loans from one sector financed by
borrowing from the other? The central purpose of
the article is to examine whether MFI membership
has affected the household's recourse to informal
loans. What is the extent and nature of informal
borrowings of MFI-member households? Are there
any inter-group variations among MFI-member
households? These issues are addressed in the next
section.
5 Informal Credit Transactions of
MFI-Member Households
This section will analyse critically the informal
credit transactions of MFI-member households to
examïne whether they differ from those of non-
member households of comparable groups. Because
of mis-targeting, the 49 MFI-member households
have been categorised between target group (1G)
and non-target group (NTG) households. There are
29 TG and 20 NTG households. There are signifi-
cant differences between these two categories. The
average landownership of category NTG is more
than 14 times that of category 1G households."
Landownership is an important factor affecting
credit behaviour, and so it is important to examine
these two groups separately despite their common
MFI-membership. Table 3 shows the total and aver-
age value of informal borrowing for the two house-
hold categories.
For what purpose do households borrow
from the informal market?
Households borrow most often from informal
sources for food consumption and loan repayment
(Table 4). Target group MFI-member households
use 81 per cent of their informal loans for financing
MFI and other informal loans and consumption.
While nearly one-third of NTG households'
informal loans are used for household food
loans led to real (physical or human) capital building.
"The average outstanding borrowing per Grameen Bank
household is about Tk. 14,000 and is significantly
higher than the average of other MEl-member
households (less than Tk. 5000).
'Forty-five per cent of TG households are, however,
landless. The average landownership per landowning
household of NTG is 8 times that of TG households.
consumption, 20 per cent of the amount is also
used for meeting other costs such as litigation and
international migration.
While nearly half (45 per cent) of the total amount
borrowed informally by target group MFI house-
holds is used for cross-financing, non-target group
MFI households, divert only 15 per cent of the
informal loans for this purpose, thereby reflecting a
big schism in loan-use patterns between the two
categories.
Why do target-group MF I-member
(category B) households need to finance
MFI loans by borrowing from informal
sources?
and
If these households finance MF! loans by
borrowing from the informal market, what
do they use MFI loans for?
Target group households, by definition, own less
than 50 decimals of land. Their average operational
landholding is also low (about 17 decimals). Wage
labour (agricultural and non-farm) is the main
income source for nearly 60 per cent of heads of
households (Table 5). Availability of agricultural
labour is seasonally determined and, as indicated
earlier, is available annually for only 230 days in
and around Biprabari. Non-farm labour comprises
primarily of rickshaw pulling. While there are no
barriers to entry, rickshaw pulling is characterised
by low returns'7 and high seasonal fluctuations.
Thus, these households are unable to manage high
levels of weekly repayment from regular income or
equity
Ostensibly, MET loans are meant for investing in
micro-enterprises to initiate the 'virtuous cycle' of
growth. But, as shown in Table 6, more than 60 per
cent of the total amount borrowed from MFIs by the
target group households is diverted for consump-
tion smoothing (28 per cent) and loan repayment
purposes (35 per cent). Most of the latter are
informal loans, but some could also be on-going
MET loans as a result of multiple loans issued by the
Grameen Bank. That is, a large proportion of MFI
loans are used for internal and external cross-
On average, a rickshaw puller earns more than the
daily agricultural wage. But net returns are low because
of maintenance costs of the rickshaw and food cost. A
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financïng i.e. away from investment in directly pro-
ductive enterprises.
Is there any evidence of inter-group
variation of MFI loan use?
Use of MET loan for cross-financing by target group
households ïs significantly higher (at 5 per cent)
than that by the non-target group (Table 6). The lat-
ter, however, use a significantly high proportion (at
1 per cent) of the MFI loan for purchase of agricul-
ture inputs and other agriculture-related purposes.
This is to be expected given the significant differ-
ences in land ownership between the two groups.
The extent of cross-financing is likely to be strongly
associated with capital deepening. The latter arises
when current borrowers receive additional credit
from existing institutions and leads to an increase in
the size of weekly instalments that a borrowing
household needs to manage. MFI households are
divided into GB and non-GB households. GB mem-
bership is good proxy for capital deepening, since
GB member households have witnessed rapid
increase in the size and portfolio of loans. The
results establish that older (those with more than 5
years' membership) and GB members are under a
double debt burden. They borrow significant
amounts from informal sources to repay MFI loans
and use significant proportions of MET loans to
repay their informal debts (Tables 7 and 8).
What are the benefits of cross-financing?
How do households perceive flow of
benefits from what seems to be a zero-sum
game?
It has been observed that more than 60 per cent of
MFI loans are used primarily for consumption
smoothing and repayment of outstanding debts. Of
the 22 loans which were primarily used for loan
repayment, 18 were GB loans. A series of focus
group discussions with different categories of bor-
rowers was conducted to get a sense of borrowers'
perceptions about the impact on their informal bor-
rowings of MFI-membership. A summary of the
discussion with women GB members is provided in
the accompanying box. The borrowers' discussions
revealed that most of the informal loans repaid with
farm labourer usually takes food at home, hut the
rickshaw puller often has to eat in the market, which
erodes his gross earnings.
Summary of Discussion with Women GB Members
Women borrowers unanimously agreed that before becoming GB members, they could not and would not
(deyoy nai .. anja nai) borrow from informal sources, especially on interest. No one would lend to them as
they were not seen as creditworthy. They were severely credit-constrained and made do with whatever
they earned. But participants also stated that they did not have the habit (obhbhash) of borrowing.
Since becoming Grameen members, the women perceived an increase in both their need and the ability
to borrow from informal sources. The need to borrow is directly linked to increasing loan sizes. When the
size of loans disbursed by Grameen was smaller, the need to borrow from informal sources was mainly at
times of seasonal slack periods. The sums involved were also low. However, with larger and multiple loans,
the need to borrow from informal sources to manage weekly instalments has become common for most
borrowers. As a participant said, 'Beshi Takar Beshi Jala, Korn Takar Kam Jala' (More trouble with more
money and less trouble with less).
The ability to borrow from informal lenders is coterminous with their having access to an almost assured
line of (increasing amounts of) credit from Grameen. The borrowers pointed out that at times the lenders
would provide additional sums to clear their Grameen dues so that the borrower could get a new Grameen
loan: almost all of which would go in repaying the informal lender. Lenders would keep track of Grameen
loan disbursements and even follow the borrower to the Bank on the day of the disbursement.
Grarneen loans were taken to repay earlier Grameen
loans. It appears that during the GB'S generous loan
regime"8, members borrowed from informal sources
to maintain good repayment performance in order
to borrow later still larger amounts from GB.
While MFI membership may have made the poor
creditworthy, the real benefit of being able to bor-
row from two markets seems to lie in their ability to
consistently smooth consumption. As one GB mem-
ber remarked wryly, 'We were always in debt, and
will always remain so. At least now we can eat three
times a day'. That is, improved access to micro-
credit seems to have improved food consumption
and nutritional status."
6 Conclusion and Policy
Implications
The article has argued that households vary in their
human and physical capital resource, and their abil-
ity to cope with risk. Credit made available by the
"The average loan size per member increased from Tk.
4,670 in 1991 to Tk. 10,842 by 1994. This was mostly
due to the introduction of seasonal loans in 1992.
"See also Zeller et at (1997) for empirical evidence
from Madagascar and Cameroon.
It is argued that hou hold productivity depends not
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MFI is not used for directly productive purposes by
all households.'° Resource-poor households tend to
use additional credit for smoothing consumption.
Such credit has a low marginal return to capital,
and adversely affects the household's ability to
maintain regular weekly repayments. Credit escala-
tion under these circumstances, because of a con-
tinuously increasing loan size, increases the
likelihood of cross-financing from informal sources
to sustain the MET's line of credit.
Cross-finance of an informal loan with another to
cope with seasonal income fluctuations and other
shocks is common. Often the household also bor-
rows from the informal sector to repay the MFI loan
when facing a short-term liquidity crisis. Our
results suggest that non-target group MFI-member
households belong to this category On average,
these households own 143 decimals of land and 75
per cent of household heads are primarily occupied
in self-cultivation (Table 5). They use 18 per cent of
the total value of the MFI loan for financing
only on conventional productive inputs and durables,
but also on skills, education, and nutri0onal and health
status of its family labour (Zeller et al., 1997: 20-21),
and therefore, the use of credit for maintaining and
enhancing human capital can be highly productive. Be
that as it may, the present research confines itself to the
direct effect of credit in increasing the households
productive capital.
informal loans (Table 6) and 15 per cent of the total
value of informal loans for financing MFI loans.
That is, the level of cross-financing is low as these
households generally have an assured income
source.
But cross-financing can have a deleterious effect on
the household economy in the long run if resource-
poor (i.e. target group MFI-member) households
continuously manage loan repayment without hav-
ing the ability to repay There is no in-built mecha-
nism2' in the present state of the lending technology
that distinguishes between borrowers who continu-
ously cross-finance to manage repayment and those
borrowing across sectors to manage short-term liq-
uidity problems. The target group MF1-member
households own less than 10 decimals on average,
and nearly 60 per cent of household heads depend
primarily on seasonally fluctuating wage labour
(Table 5). They are more likely to need to regularly
finance their MEl loans with informal loans. As evi-
dent, they use 45 per cent of their informal bor-
rowings for financing MFI loans (Table 4), and 35
per cent of the MFI loan value for financing infor-
mal loans (Table 6). Differences in the extent of use
of informal and MFI loans between target group
and non-target group MFI-member households is
depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
High levels of cross-financing deplete the capital of
the loan, and reduce the value of the new loan that
is used to repay or service the old. The process
turns into a 'vicious cycle' as smaller investments
into directly productive enterprises yield less
returns, thus requiring even higher loans the next
time to repay the original loan. It erodes the prof-
itability of any enterprise, especially if a high inter-
est loan is taken from the informal market.
Cross-financing can be sustained when loan sizes
remain small, But most MFIs put borrowers ort a
treadmill of continuously increasing loan size so
that borrowers who manage to repay a small loan
are eligible to receive a larger loan the next time.
There is little screening of loan applications by MFIs
and members end up borrowing more than they
In a group contract, members are expected to screen
each other's loan applications. This does not happen in
practice since members screen the person and not the
project. If a member is reliable and trustworthy, she can
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can repay Poor screening seems to be a direct con-
sequence of credit escalation. The number of mem-
bers at a GB centre for instance, has increased from
20 to 35-40, and each borrower in Biprabari on
average has 1.83 loans (excluding the housing
loans) of average size 1k. 6,594 and maturing at dif-
ferent times. While overall the growth in the num-
ber of branches and centres has declined between
1986 and 1994, the expansion in the number of
groups has been stable. The total (cumulative) dis-
bursement expanded about 32-fold between 1986
and 1993. This rapid expansion was fuelled by the
growth of average annual lending per branch from
Tk. 1.86 million in 1986 to 1k. 14.59 million in
1994 (Khandker et al. 1995), and is likely to have
greatly reduced the monitoring capability of the
field worker. Repayment of the previous loan is the
only criterion for assessing both the ability and the
willingness of the borrower to repay This could
lead to delinquency
An easily accessible loan is always attractive to a
cash-starved and indebted poor household, its
resource profile and the wider economic and policy
environment impose limits on the marginal return
to capital. Over an extended period, the returns on
activities financed by MFIs are also likely to
decrease, given demand constraints, as more and
more people join the programme and undertake
similar activities (Khandker et al. 1995). Credit
escalation, accompanied by a fixed repayment
schedule, extracts more capital than the household's
earnings, and can lead to the inevitable collapse of
the system.2'
lt clearly emerges that MFIs should eschew simplis-
tic assumptions that increasing loan size ensures
increased benefit across all household categories, or
that households must be deriving some benefit if
loan repayment rates are high. Increasing loan sizes
puts additional debt burden on MEl-member
households. The burden is particularly heavy for
target group households whose access to economic
opportunities within and outside the village is con-
strained by its limited human capital resource and
the macro-economic environment. Often large loan
borrow unusually large amounts.
Collapse of the joint liability contract in Madhupur
has been analysed by Matin (1997a).
sizes compel households to borrow from informal
sources to service the MFI-loans.23 This is corrobo-
rated by another recent study of the Grameen Bank
(Rahman 1997: 2)
Loan disbursement increased more than three-
fold between 1991 and 1994. The pressure
from fellow members and coercion from bank
workers for regular weekly repayment burdens
many women to accept different types of loans
from Grameen Bank and informal sources in
order to maintain the regularities of weekly
repayment of instalments on previous loans.
Such lending process itself leads to a spiraling
debt cycle in which many members in the study
area feel they are trapped.
It is also evident that there is no direct relationship
between high repayment rates and household wel-
fare. A high repayment rate of MFI loans may be
maintained through cross-financing from the infor-
mal sector.
7 What is to be Done?
MFIs have provided credit access, by designing a
standard product, to a large number of borrowers
who would not otherwise be served. However, there
is an urgent need to redesign the MET lending tech-
nology to make it sensitive to household initial con-
ditions. An inflexible technology is unable to meet
the needs of borrowers at opposite ends of the eco-
nomic scale.
For instance, MFIs should consider individual-lia-
bility lending to long-time borrowers with good
repayment record and who now borrow large sums.
Many of them are likely to belong to the non-target
group with large credit needs, greater risk-bearing
capacity, an ability to provide collateral, and the
necessary entrepreneurial skills to invest in produc-
tive enterprises. For them (j) the group contract and
' The average instalment size of target group MOI
households is Tk. 209 against Tk. 195 of non-target
group MOI households. In spite of considerable
differences in household resources, the difference in
average weekly repayment is not significant.
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the joint liability system can be dispensed with, (ii)
different repayment schedules devised, and (iii)
loan applications screened after detailed project
appraisals. Households belonging to this category
have access to physical collateral (most often land)
and do not need to be bound by the terms of social
collateral in the form of groups. They use MFI loans
for investment in productive enterprises with long
gestation periods and so may prefer a monthly (or
sometimes longer) repayment schedule. Further,
loan applications of larger borrowers should he
screened carefully to assess the economic viability
of the enterprise. While these measures are likely to
reduce the overhead costs of níembership mobilisa-
tion, borrowers' transaction costs and the adminis-
trative costs of lending,2 more importantly, they
would create the right incentives for larger and reg-
ular borrowers to maintain high repayment rates.
On the other hand, MFIs should mimic the infor-
mal sector when lending to poorer target group
households by allowing for seasonality and provid-
ing repayment flexibility and a ceiling on total loan
size per household. These households borrow small
amounts, often in kind and are under severe dietary
stress during the agricultural lean seasons. It is dur-
ing these slack periods that they often run into
severe cashflow problems when, with little regular
incomes, they have to maintain the inflexible
weekly repayment of MEl loans. MET membership
enables them to borrow from the informal sector,
but at the same time, traps them into a regular
process of cross-financing that can ultimately pre-
vent them from initiating the 'virtuous cycle' of
growth.
MEIs can seriously compete with informal lenders
and provide a real choice to MFI-member house-
holds only by designing a differentiated and diverse
lending technology sensitive to household resource
endowments.
These outcomes were also suggested by Khandker et
al. (1995) but the authors based their observations on
branch-level data and did not address the impact on
repayment incentives
Table 1: Economic and Demographic Characteristics of MFI Member Households
Notes: 1 For households with members belonging to more than one MFI, the date of first joining has been used to
determine household membership.
2 Households with less than 50 decimals of land are included within the target group
3 Figures in parentheses are coefficients of variation.
4 SDS is a savings-based organisation with no land-based restrictions on membership.
Table 2: MFI Borrowings of MFI-Member Households
Notes: 1 For households with members belonging to more than one MFI, the date of first joining has been used to
determine household membership.
2 Weekly instalment = Volume of loans excluding housing loans + Tk.2 + Tk.20
50
where: Tk.2 is the compulsory savings and Tk.20 the approximate weekly instalment for the housing loan, if taken
3 Figures in parentheses are coefficients of variation.
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MFI Number of
member
households1
Average land
ownership
(decimals)
Proportion of
households
within the
target group1
Average annual
per capita
income (Tk.)
Average
household size
(AME)
ASA
Buro
Caritas
GB
SDS
Total
13
4
2
27
3
49
60.0 (2.80)
62.8 (1.04)
39.0 (1.89)
49.7 (1.43)
164.8 (0.37)
0.80
0.50
0.50
0.59
n.a.1
5,896 (0.67)
7,532 (0.32)
8,365 (0.75)
6,854 (0.64)
15,086 (0.42)
3.4 (0.25)
3.3 (0.19)
3.3 (0.42)
4.3 (0.35)
3.7 (0.40)
MF! Number of
member
households1
Number of
members
Number of
loans
Total bor-
rowings
(Tk.)
Average
loan size
(Tk.)
Average
loan size
per house-
hold (Tk.)
Average
weekly
instalment
(Tk.)
ASA
Buro
Caritas
GB
SDS
Total
13
4
2
27
3
49
13
5
3
29
3
53
13
5
3
53
3
87
64,000
30,980
4,500
349,500
7,000
455,980
4,923
6,196
1,500
6,594
2,333
5,241
4,923 0.73)
7,745 (0,35)
2,250 (0.78)
12,944(0.41)
2,333 (0.25)
9,306
103 (0.70)
160 (0.34)
50 (0.71)
293 (0.39)
52 (0.22)
Table 3: Informal Credit Transactions by Household Category
Notes: 1 Figures in parentheses are coefficients of variation (CV).
2 These figures are approximate back-of-the envelope calculations.
Table 4: Informal Loan Use by Household Category
Notes: 1 'Other' loan uses include legal fees, costs of international migration and house repair.
2 This is for repayment of other informal loans as households in this category are not MFI members.
Table 5: Primary Occupation of Household Head of different Household Categories
Note: 1 Figures in parentheses are percentage of total households in that category.
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Household category
Variable TG non-MFI TG MF! NTG MF! NTG non-MF!
Total number of households (N) 27 29 20 16
Number of households borrowing (in cash or
kind)
22 27 19 12
Total borrowing (Tk.)
Mean 2,917 6,133 8,121 7,521
Median 1,685 2,255 5,630 4,805
Number of times borrowed in last 12 months 3.95 (0.57) 5.29 (0.58) 4.42 (0.83) 2.75 (0.49)
Frequency of borrowing - once every: 13 weeks 10 weeks 12 weeks 19 weeks
Average loan size per household (Tk.) 133 227 427 627
Proportion of informal loan use (by value)
HH category Number of
households
reporting
transaction
Household
food con-
sumption
Agriculture Business Health and
social
MF! loan
repayment
Others'
TG non-MFI
TG MF!
NTG MR
NTG non-
MR
22
27
19
12
0.42
0.36
0.32
0.28
0.25
0.08
0.12
0.26
0.08
0.02
0.08
0.08
0.15
0.08
0.13
0,15
0.03'
0.45
0.15
0
0.07
0.01
0.20
0.23
Household category
Primary occupation TG non-MFI TG MFI NTG MFI NTG non-MFI
Self-cultivation 3 (11) 5 (17) 15 (75) 12 (75)
Agri. labour 6 (22) 4(14) 0 o
Non-agri. labour 5 (19) 13 (45) 0 2 (13)
Self-employed 9 (33) 6(21) 3(15) 1(6)
Salaried 4 (15) 1(3) 2 (10) 1 (6)
Total Households 27 (100) 29 (100) 20 (100) 16 (100)
Table 6: MFI Loan Use by MFI Membership Category
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Proportion of MFI loan use (by value)
MFI mcm-
bership
category
Number of
households
reporting
transaction
Household
food con-
sumption
Agriculture Business Health and Loan
social repayment
Others
Target group
Non-target
group
t-test
23 0.28
23 0.15
0.02 T
0.14
0.18
0.16
0.15
0.28
0.35
0.18
**
0.02
0.09
Proportion of times informal loan used for
MFI mcm-
bership
period
Number of
households
reporting
transaction
Household
food con-
sumption
Agriculture Business Health and
social
MFI loan
repayment
Others
New (<5 yrs)
Old (>5 yrs)
t-test
23
23
0.45
0.38
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.19
0.15
0.09
0.28
0.18
0.09
Proportion of times informal loan used for
T
MFI Number of Household Agriculture Business Health and MFI loan Others
category households
reporting
transaction
food con-
sumption
social repayment
GB 27 0.43 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.32 . 0.03
Non GB
t-test
22 0.42 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.19
Notes: significant at 1%
significant at 5%
Notes: significant at 1%
significant at 5%
Table 7h: Comparative Use of Informal Loan by Grameen Bank Households
Notes: significant at 1%
significant at 5%
Table 7a: Informal Loan Use by Membership Period
Table 8a: Comparative Use of MFI Loan by Grameen Bank Households
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Proportion of MFI loans used for
OthersMF!
category
Number of
households
reporting
transaction
Household
food con-
sumption
Agriculture Business Health and
social
MF! loan
repayment
GB
Non GB
t-test
27
22
0.34
0.32
0.12
0.15
0.14
0.26
0.06
0.08
0.32
0.15
***
0.02
0.04
Proportion of MFI loans used for
MFI type
category
Number of
households
reporting
transaction
Household
food con-
sumption
Agriculture Business Health and
social
MFI loan
repayment
Others
New (<5 yrs)
Old (>5 yrs)
t-test
26
23
0.38
0.32
0.15
0.08
0.24
0.12
0.03
0.06
0.18
0.38
**
0.02
0.04
Notes: * * * significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
Notes: significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
Table 8b: Informal Loan Use by Membership Period
I I C-) o
(J)
(n
C) b
o
C cn
(o C-) C
Figure 1: Informal and MFI Loan Use by Target-Group MF 1-member Households
Informal Loan Use by Target Group MF! HHs
MF! Loan Use by Target Group MFI HHs
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Figure 2: Informal and MFI Loan Use by Non Target-Group MFI-member Households
Informal Loan Use by Non Target Group MFI HHs
Loan Fav
18%
MFI Loan Use by Non Target Group MFI HHs
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